constructions used for the Kripke-Joyal semantics. In Sectionl the-key elemerrts-of"Smith and_Mclstyrdcigte1prciatioLqlfiu$fled]5 inLentionalitJt-arejrrielly skeLched. Srrecific categoricalcoasLructions-:.redeveJoped-in Section.2 and thnrvn to ccrrespond,t"o the-elements -of-aLfuLentionalme,ntal enenlfur Section.3-SQme strrecifie issues.r.egardiwlbeiaterBretation-of the pas.t, -beliefs and act'ality ere raised-in sectio:ra.-"In_sec.ties-J tbediscuc0lan_-rsgoscluded*by_eompa_rins the categorical interpretetion,-deyeloped"in_seetions:i-^aud-4*:rit}-[he_man$Jorld$ int erpretalios .of Smith_asd*ldelet$s.
L_IUSS ERI,, S LN rpN IT oNA!ITX.
Husserlwas_isteresledj-a_erplalsiugjhe_qa,ture'Oltlqs_e_!0ellalgsqlilghighsrg
ChAraqlqrrzed ly*rutenti"qn-alrtJ,_ _He ealled ia.cts of cAn$ciousn_e-$pl-!h_o,.se_e-v_qnt_s-:gtri-ch r_elated.-lA, an object."1 I.:s_tead pf*explicgll"Bgig_t*eqtiqnatily,by ex_qlqining t!e--na!gj-e_q{-t_hJ_p!.!gglq tgtulri*s--wh-qh--aS!.q*o,f-cogscip-upsgs$ are, dir-gg!.e-d, gmith-and Mql+.tyrg h-av-e-gtalpqgd_tlel Eugterj'j_aeqoust grq_ b_e viewgd a$_ o_ng w_biqb Feeks !9_ Ug,{_erstaq{ in_teqt!_o_qally.isler4gs of thgrelations$p_b.,elseegtbesu-bje-c__t,and_thcebieqt-.r0 Eagh*qp!$crqu"s.-agl, acce-rding to Smith and Mclntyrg, con-sisls of-three conp-erpntl-A-Aprgil,3*naens_atd aq__o_b&st,___Ahe aoes?q is the r_eal pad, gf a cp,nS=cio-u-s_ aqt.wtrieb makes. the experienge intedioual"t_l-,T*c-ao,,er?.o_, g-s the other_hasd,_i,s n_e-t lre_all -but aq a_t_empor-al kiu{qtneaula&_or_$raa-13. Ib_e_-oal"ologr_s-d*-si-a,t-us_of th-e _oljest is_rr$lquada_utL oq-this reqe-usJ,. !hus* jm-act*miarl&Jisdir_eete.d to'ward-or i_s iale_n"tiqaal_ty relaledlq).as*shi?et jf aqd*edy-if-the-aet (or its.noesis).entertaius a eer,tain--noe-natie*Siau-and,that Siqn pres_qnbes.-t hat ob iecL. " 13 Objects of natural experience are transcendent objects in the sense that they can BaruYs never be fully conceptually captured in a single act. This is due to the fact that the perceptual evidence for the existence of such objects is always incomplete from the point of view of a single act.14 In fact, perceptual experiences are more complicated than other intentional experiences such as, for example, judging, remembering and imagining, because they entaii a sensory aspect. The barrage of sensations or hyleis an aspect of the noesis and requirs a Sinn to give it shape so that it can be experienced as a perception of something.ls For Husserl, perception forms the basis of one's understanding of the world and hence received much of his attention.16 This problem of the perception of transcendent objects highlights the fact that uelac:i g-f sgnsci.ousness exists in isolation frsm other acts. Something about the Object _is always lef! opea in an act with a particular Sinn. In order to explicate the way it whic-h_ f,urth-er de-t-e.-rm=ruatious. of an object are possible, Husserl introduced the totion of .an ac-t::-ho--ri-zo_n--0.,eple-c-tion of possible acts whose Sinne are compatible with the Sinnof thg o_ngin'al_.aeL t-b"-a"t..ea-n further determine a given object. rT parallel to this act-hori-zo-u i-s*aa -ob"ject--horizQn which is the collection of further determined objects that th-es_e_fu_rth,e_r-,a.ets.
Qf cOnsciOusness are directed- tO.warde .18 asgo-rdiug tq smith and Mclntyre's interpretatioq-o{ Eu-$_erl"s_t}s-o.I_Lff*eaeh EipL@ b-€,b-r-oken dowa into two components: the'predicate senses,which prescribe_ t!p*properties that aq object is to have, and an x which specifies the object to which the,pr_orer-t&s*arc ascribed*11--.F-ru-t-her d9ter-mination of an object, then, consists of further conditions-tba! are to be mei-by*a-u_o-bje-c_t,, glven_in -ae--t's w-dh thesame,X following an examination of Husserl's notions of horizon and manifold, h,ewe:et, S-mit-h and Mclntyre relaxed the constraints on the definition of an act-horizon, so that the sinne of the acts in the horizon need not be strictly compatibie with the srrzz o__f _the q-r-igrgal-a-el20 al-owing for further perceptions of ar object that reveal it to.-be -dif&-re-g.i trom wha.tit was originally perceived to be, and so that these further aets Leed.np-t V g-g,cggsqdly.fqrther determine the object in the sense of ipcludipg fugh,-e1lnform.atio-4 ab_oul l!-.?.1.It is this more liberal interpretation of horizon that is adopted he-re-.
For Busserl, each &ct-horizo,u is predeli-neated iu aq a-qt-qf c-onseiou$n-ess so -t_ha-t_!s-!o_e.
pps-sible a-ejs are understood to further determine {he object of the original act, an-d _o-t-be_rs aJs$ee-----------------n ,as sot-doiqg so. These eSeh.ob&etsas--be*u,ad*erstaad-as-"a possible obJect, determined as tha! poosr-b-le objgel*gdy ug-tO-a-CeltArn,-p-oin-t. That is to s4y, the changes of the object on,a,..co_ver -qag_be tr:Ide-r-s*to9--d.A6-_cp.4tIlejis€, or veritying the possible obtct given in the.iur--t_ial sgt Igs-ugLaforu.ulalios",t-be-role that the object-horizon caq.-haye iq dele-ruoJs-uglh€ objeet i-a the-ini-tial actn is.rev-ealed by Lhe compatibility condition. If there is a sequ-eaee-gI future mentd-cv-eatc iuwhich "t-he objects that are determined are pairwise rerg3le-d ta, be the-same-oblbct isarurcpdat-e fu-rther-fu-turq-states, then they can be said to deterqi4e a-T2 V Barus s relstble,sfie_cljn---the._o_ri_Srnal act. This is just a sta|eg-e-4_! pf-!h-e cqmp"alibili_tyepldili-Ag when the future mental states are the categorical objects of a cover f-ol a4_Ab_jggt_d_AI_Ag! glegn$*cJausstrl.
Finally, j-t cal be s_hown that the collgclions q_f falsrliefl.p.fpossible verificatio,n ch_ains salis-fy t-he-defi.ning conditions for a pretopology defi-ned in tle last se-ction.-,e,oa-dtion (i) is met-tri-dally, in that an act-horizon must consist of 4t lgast ong agt.*.-Q_q-n{i_tien (iilis qlq;-q _i4!_erqs_ting. It translates into the statement that an initial aC! mUq-t*be_ag a-st-*horizp-n in and of itseif. This corresponds to the case in the example a_bove rvhe*re.-a-q9
suspe-nds judgement as to whether or not the tree is a real tree or a hologrg,phic i-m_a€e_aurl the-o-bje--cJ. of the act is only that which is determined in the aet_itself.
eo-n-di-ti-on (iii) gakes precise the notion that no obict is ever fully dgte-r^u*in-eAJul
Sub"iee-t.-to further determinations. Any act in the horizon is itself an "qngr^u-AJ*agt._Wlhjl6
collectipn qf-act hsrizons. These help to determine the object of such an act--in*t-he-acl hmaou"_rshieh_"iu turn is part of the horizon of the origtu-al_a_ct-.
Qgnd$ioqliv)"s-!a!e-S that the possible determinations of objects at a given po-iulj! tiBe-are*uaJl-os!,-b.ut modified under changes of circumstance. In the exampl_e_alqvg, EuppA$g-0*o is the action o{ turning around and speaking to someone and then-f-a.elglhe bee-.-agai-n.. The options that one had initially are still there, but in modi-fi-pd fors.
Slppqse tbat-o-n-e h-ad $po--ken t-g thg ar,tist responsible for the-holograpf,ic maple tree. 
